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This article analyses the effectiveness of hiring credits. Using comprehensive administrative data,
we show that the French hiring credit, implemented during the Great Recession, had significant positive
employment effects and no effects on wages. Relying on the quasi-experimental variation in labour
cost triggered by the hiring credit, we estimate a structural search and matching model. Simulations
of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three
features: it was non-anticipated, temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages. We estimate that the cost
per job created by permanent hiring credits, either countercyclical or time-invariant, in an environment
with flexible wages would have been much higher.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hiring credits have been used in the U.S. and in a number of European countries to counteract
the employment effects of the 2008–9 recession.1 Despite this wide use, many economists think
that hiring credits are probably useless during recessions, when aggregate demand is insufficient
relative to labour and other resources available in the economy.2 In fact, there is very little empirical
evidence about the effects of hiring credits. Evidence on federal programmes in the U.S. dates
back to the 80s (Perloff and Wachter, 1979; Bishop, 1981), and the only recent evidence concerns
hiring credits implemented at the U.S. states level (Neumark and Grijalva, 2017). We seize the
opportunity of the natural experiment induced by the 2009 French hiring credit to highlight the
1. See OECD (2010) for a detailed presentation of hiring credit measures in 2009.
2. For instance, Becker (2010), Posner (2010) and Gali (2013).
The editor in charge of this paper was Aureo de Paula.
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effectiveness of such policies. Reduced-form estimates of the effects of the French programme
relying on comprehensive administrative data show that the hiring credit has had a significant
impact on employment. Then, we use quasi-experimental variations induced by the programme
to estimate key structural parameters of a search and matching model. Simulations of this model
show that the cost per job created is very sensitive to the type of hiring credit—temporary versus
permanent, countercyclical versus time-invariant,3 generalized to all hires versus targeted at a
small subset of hires—and to the economic environment—rigid versus flexible wages.
The French hiring credit, announced on 4 December 2008, relieved firms from social
contributions on new hires until 31 December 2009. The programme was arbitrarily restricted,
for budgetary reasons, to firms with fewer than 10 employees, and to low-wage workers. We
show that these restrictions and other features of the programme ensure that its implementation
can be considered as a natural experiment. Moreover, only a small fraction of hires were actually
eligible for the hiring credits so that the programme did not trigger spillover effects.
Our evaluation of the French hiring credit relies on two identification strategies. The difference-
in-differences strategy compares the evolution of small firms (between 6 and 10 employees)
and medium-size firms (between 10 and 14 employees) from November 2008, just before the
program’s inception, until November 2009.4 The IV strategy compares employment pool × sector
cells with high and low shares of subsidized hires. We use the share of low-wage workers from
2006 to 2008 as an instrument for the share of subsidized hires. Both strategies yield converging
results. The French hiring credit significantly increased by 0.8 percentage point the growth rate of
targeted firms. Moreover, the employment effects are concentrated as expected on eligible jobs,
i.e. low-wage jobs. The impact of the hiring credit emerged quickly: hires and employment began
to rise three months after the introduction of the credit. The evolution of hours worked is similar
to that of employment, meaning that firms did not substitute hours of new workers benefiting from
the hiring credit for those of incumbent employees. We find no increase in wages associated with
the hiring credit, and firms did not increase layoffs to hire workers at lower cost. Year placebo
tests, and robustness analysis varying the firms’ size bandwidth selecting the estimation sample,
confirm our results. Comparing ineligible medium-sized firms in labour markets with a high or
low fraction of subsidized hires, we show that the hiring credit did not trigger equilibrium effects,
either through wage adjustments or effects on labour market tightness.
Building on these reduced-form analyses, we use quasi-experimental variations in labour cost
induced by the program to estimate a structural search and matching model. We show that the
variations in the coverage of the hiring credit and in the tightness across local labour markets
allow us to identify two key parameters: the elasticity of the marginal revenue (with respect
to labour) and the vacancy posting cost. The time-variation in tightness and job finding rates
within local labour markets before the 2009 French hiring credit allow us to identify a third key
parameter, i.e. the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the number of job-seekers,
as in Borowczyk-Martins et al. (2013).
Introducing directed search with wage posting into the model, in line with Moen (1997) we
show, in the spirit of the sufficient statistic approach (Chetty, 2009), that the three structural
parameters estimated above are sufficient to define the cost per job created by hiring credits in
3. By definition, hiring credits provide subsidies to new jobs for a limited period of time at the beginning of the job
spell. Temporary hiring credits are one-off schemes that provide these subsidies during specific periods, whereas permanent
hiring credits provide them permanently. Permanent hiring credits can be either time-invariant or countercyclical, i.e.
provided in slowdowns only. Neumark and Grijalva (2017) report that 99 of the 147 hiring credits recorded in the United
States over the period 1970–2012 are permanent.
4. Consistent with the program, we split firms according to their size computed from November 2007 to November
2008, before the program was announced.
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different cases: exogenous versus endogenous wage, temporary versus permanent hiring credit
(either countercyclical or time-invariant),5 hiring credit generalized to all firms versus hiring
credit targeted at a small subset of firms (sufficiently small to have no impact on the labour
market tightness). Using our previous estimates of the structural parameters, we compute the cost
per job created by these counterfactual policies. In the baseline scenario, which corresponds to
the 2009 French hiring credit, the gross cost per job created is around one fourth of the average
annual wage. To compute the cost per job created net of savings on social benefits, we exploit a
survey that provides information about the characteristics of the beneficiaries of the hiring credit.
It turns out that the 2009 hiring credit has been very effective, since the net cost per job created
is about zero.
Nevertheless, our simulations suggest that the effectiveness of hiring credits is contingent on
particular circumstances. In line with Kitao et al. (2010) and Kaas and Kircher (2015), we find
that the (one-off, non-expected) temporary nature of hiring credits plays a key role: permanent
hiring credits, even targeted at a small subset of firms, create jobs at a cost multiplied by a factor
of four compared with one-off non-anticipated temporary credits available for new hires during
one year.6 Hiring credits generalized to all firms would have featured only a slightly higher gross
cost per job created than a similar hiring credit targeted at a small subset of firms, as long as
wages are exogenous. This result, obtained in a context of high unemployment rates, means
that congestion effects induced by the hiring credit are too small to induce significant increases
in recruitment costs. When wages are flexible, the cost per job created by temporary hiring
credits generalized to all firms is only slightly higher than the cost per job created by temporary
hiring credits targeted at a small subset of firms, because one-off temporary increases in labour
market tightness induced by temporary hiring credits have little impact on the expected gains of
unemployed workers, and therefore on wages. However, permanent economy-wide hiring credits
induce permanent increases in labour market tightness, and thus have a stronger impact on the
expected gains of unemployed workers and then on wages. We find that the reaction of wages
multiplies by about 2 the cost per job created by generalized and permanent hiring credits. This
casts doubt about the effectiveness of permanent hiring credits, which are frequent (OECD, 2010;
Neumark and Grijalva, 2017).
Our article contributes to the empirical debate on the effectiveness of hiring credits. It is
related to Neumark and Grijalva (2017) who analyse state hiring credits in the U.S.7 Using a
difference-in-differences strategy across U.S. states, they point to moderate positive employment
effects of credits targeting the unemployed during recessions. To our knowledge, our article is
the first empirical evaluation of a temporary hiring credit relying on comprehensive firm-level
administrative data. The richness of the data and the quasi-experimental situation induced by the
French hiring credit allow us to evaluate the impact of the hiring credit, with proper identification
strategies, on a wide range of outcomes not available in previous studies. Moreover, our article
is also the first empirical evaluation of a temporary hiring credit in Europe. European empirical
evidence mostly concerns the effects of permanent payroll tax reductions. As both hires and
5. In this article, the cost per job created by a temporary hiring credit, set out for one year, corresponds to the
monthly cost necessary to create one supplementary job at the one-year time horizon, whereas the cost per job created by a
permanent hiring credit, set out without any foreseen time limit, is the monthly cost necessary to create one supplementary
job permanently, i.e. on an infinite time horizon.
6. Note that permanent hiring credits are different from wage subsidies, as, for a given worker, the credit vanishes
after a certain tenure in the firm—one year in our simulations.
7. Our work is also related to the evaluations of the New Job Tax Credit (NJTC) implemented in the U.S. during the
70s by Perloff and Wachter (1979) and Bishop (1981). Both studies find positive effects of the program, but their analyses
suffer from the economy-wide implementation of the NJTC, which makes it difficult to define a proper counterfactual
control group.
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incumbents are eligible for these payroll tax reductions, they may imply large deadweight losses,
and their estimated effects only partially inform us about the effects of hiring credits.8 In Europe,
hiring subsidies may also be part of broader strategies to activate the unemployed. They are
frequently coupled with job search assistance programs, which makes it difficult to distinguish
their impact, as in Blundell et al. (2004).9
We also contribute to the literature which builds bridges between quasi-experimental
or experimental data and structural estimation, i.e. Attanasio et al. (2012), Ferrall (2012),
Gautier et al. (2012), Galiani et al. (2015), Lise et al. (2015), Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Wise
(1985). Our approach features both internal validity and external validity. The source of the
identification of the key structural parameters is quasi-experimental and makes use of a well-
defined policy shock. Thus we gain internal validity. Then simulations of the underlying economic
model enable us to discuss the external validity of our reduced-form results. This framework
is useful to quantify congestion externalities in search and matching models (Beaudry et al.,
2012, 2014; Gautier et al., 2012; Crépon et al., 2013; Lalive et al., 2013). It is closely related to
Beaudry et al. (2014) who show that the wage elasticity of employment is larger in absolute value
at the industry-city level than at the city-level. They argue that the effects of wage shocks at the
city-level are damped by congestion externalities induced by the reaction of the city-level labour
market tightness. We also find that congestion externalities play a very important role through
wages. Congestion externalities exert an upward pressure on wages that significantly reduces the
employment effects of economy-wide hiring credits compared with hiring credits targeted at a
small subset of firms.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hiring credit scheme (zéro charges)
implemented in France in 2009. Section 3 presents the data, descriptive statistics and the empirical
strategy of the reduced-form approaches. The difference-in-differences estimates are presented
in Section 4. The results of the IV estimation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 shows that
the French program did not trigger equilibrium effects. Section 7 proceeds to the structural
estimation of the search and matching model and evaluates the cost per job created by hiring
credits in different environments. The last section concludes.
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The zéro charges (zero contributions) measure was announced by the French President on
4 December 2008. According to the original announcement, any hire (or temporary contract
renewal) of a low-wage worker in a firm with fewer than 10 employees occurring from the date of
the announcement until 31 December 2009 could benefit during the same year from an employer
social contribution relief.10 The relief is maximal for workers with an hourly remuneration at the
minimum wage level (8.82 euros in 2009). With zéro charges, employers do not pay any social
contribution at the minimum wage level. The relief then decreases as the hourly wage level rises
up to 1.6 times the minimum wage. Figure 1 shows that the hiring credit reduces the labour cost
by 12% for a full-time worker paid at the minimum wage. The maximum amount of the hiring
credit over 12 months represents 2,400 euros. When the wage is 30% above the minimum wage,
the subsidy rate represents only 4% of the labour cost.
8. Indeed, Goos and Konings (2007), Huttunen et al. (2013), Bennmarker et al. (2009), Egebark and Kaunitz
(2013) and Skedinger (2014) find rather small employment effects of permanent payroll tax reduction.
9. A notable attempt to distinguish the relative effectiveness of the different components of activation strategies is
Sianesi (2008). For Sweden in the 1990s, she finds that entering a temporary job subsidy program rather than searching
further in open unemployment increased employment rates soon after the program ended.
10. The new relief is in addition to the existing general social contribution reduction on low wages called the Fillon
reduction, which has prevailed since the 1990s and concerns all firms in the private sector.
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Figure 1
The hiring credit schedule.
Notes: The horizontal axis reports the monthly wage (in euros) net of employer social contributions of a full time worker (in 2009, the
monthly minimum wage was 1,338 euros in gross terms, i.e. including employees’ social contributions). The vertical axis reports the
monthly labour cost. The continuous line displays the labour cost without the hiring credit. The dashed line shows the labour cost with the
hiring credit.
Before the first announcement, the policy was not anticipated because it was kept secret as
part of a stimulus package to be disclosed all at once.11 This is illustrated by Figure 2 which
shows that Google searches for the item “hiring subsidy” (aide embauche) started to increase in
December 2008, once the announcement for the program was made. There is no Google search
for the item zéro charges before early 2009.
The practical details of the hiring credit were rapidly set out in a decree published on 20
December 2008. To start with, only firms and associations belonging to the private sector could
get the hiring credit. Firms and associations had to request the zéro charges relief for each hire
separately, filling out a one-page form and attaching the labour contract. The claim had to be
sent to the French Public Employment Service (Pôle emploi) which reimbursed for the social
contributions payments on eligible hires at the end of each quarter.
Second, to be sponsored, hires had to be on contracts lasting at least one month, and not
otherwise sponsored by other targeted special measures, such as even more generous and pre-
existing subsidies for some disadvantaged groups (e.g. the long-term unemployed) or apprentices;
household jobs were also excluded on the ground of their specific and pre-existing subsidies. The
hiring credit was not restricted to firms with net employment growth, and it was not limited to
the hiring of the long-term unemployed or any other disadvantaged groups.
Third, only entities with fewer than 10 full-time equivalent employees12 on average between
January and November 2008 could apply. Hence, the period used to define the size criteria ends
11. For instance the newspaper Les Echos, describes in an article entitled “Le gouvernement envisage d’accélérer
ses paiements et remboursements aux entreprises”, published on 27 November 2008, all potential measures that the
President Sarkozy was supposed to announce the following week at the Press conference of 4 December 2008. The hiring
credit is not mentioned in this article. On 4 December 2008, the article entitled “Sarkozy dévoile un plan de 26 milliards
d’euros pour relancer l’économie”, summarizing the contents of the press conference, does mention the hiring credit.
12. The size criteria are very precise and follow the usual rules set in the labour code (see cerfa n◦ 13838-01). Only
ordinary employees are kept in the computation of the size (thus excluding apprentices and temporary agency employees
and those hired as part of a labour market program). The size is computed as the average of the end-of-month number
of employees from January to November 2008. Fixed-term workers contribute pro rata temporis their number of days
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Figure 2
Results of Google search for the policy name.
Notes: The vertical axis reports the monthly number of searches for one term relative to the highest point on the figure; “aide embauche”
means hiring subsidy. Variations in spellings (e.g. “zéro charges”, “zero charge”) yield similar patterns to “zero charges”. The vertical line
indicates the date at which the hiring credit was introduced. Source: Google Trends website.
just before the announcement of the policy, on 4 December 2008. A growing firm reaching 10 or
more employees over the year 2009 could still continue to receive subsidies and apply for new
hires until the end of 2009. This meant that the size criteria could not be manipulated by firms
wishing to benefit from the hiring credit.
Fourth, applying firms must not have fired any workers for economic reasons on the same
job over the six months preceding the hiring date, nor must they have previously fired this
particular worker over the same period from any other job, and they must have paid all their
social contributions in the past.
On 16 November 2009, the policy was extended to hires occurring up to 30 June 2010.13 On
this occasion, the duration of the hiring credit was extended for up to 12 months from the hiring
date, instead of the cutoff date of 31 December 2009 for the initial scheme. This new rule was also
applicable to hires made in 2009 before the announcement of the extension, and which already
benefited from zéro charges. Firms below the average of 10 full-time equivalent employees from
January 2009 to December 2009 were also eligible for the extended program for their new hires
in 2010. Hence it is more challenging to study the effects of the policy in 2010, as some firms
treated in 2009 may not have been able to apply in 2010, because eligibility for the extended
period was then based on the average size over 2009. As a consequence, we focus on outcomes
in 2009.
present in the firm over the month. This means that fixed-term workers hired on the 15th of the month working full-time
represent 0.5 employees. However, workers hired on permanent contracts are counted as 1 employee during the month no
matter what day of the month they were hired on. All wage-earners working part-time, either on fixed-term or permanent
contracts, are accounted pro rata temporis their regular number of hours during the month, excluding overtime hours.
For instance, wage-earners working mornings only are counted as 0.5 employee.
13. The first announcement about a possible extension was made in the end of September 2009. This fact and the
corresponding google search data shown on Figure 2, suggest that firms did not expect that the credit would be extended
before the last quarter of 2009.
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Figure 3
Firm size density.
The hiring credit was initially part of a wider array of policies—the stimulus package—
designed to cope with the 2008–9 crisis. Within that array, this is the only item specifically targeted
at small firms, and the only item directly altering the labour cost. The exact size threshold of 10
employees was mostly determined by the government budget constraints. Broadly speaking, there
were no other explicit legal changes in this period that exerted a varying impact on firms with
less or more than 10 employees.
While there are some minor discontinuities at the 10-employee threshold in the French
legislation,14 we do not see any accumulation of firms just below the threshold (Figure 3). This
suggests that the changes in the labour cost or in the labour regulations at the threshold are not
significant, nor salient enough to lead firms to sort. Such a sorting might have meant that firms
below and above the threshold were reacting differently to the business cycles. This is in line with
Ceci-Renaud and Chevalier (2010) who do not find any bunching at the 10-employee threshold.
This contrasts with the accumulation of firms just below the 50-employee threshold, as reported
by Gourio and Roys (2014) and Garicano et al. (2013). The difference in patterns around the 10
and 50-employee threshold is probably due to the greater change in costs at the 50-employee
threshold and its greater saliency.15 As Garicano et al. (2013, p. 14) put it, “Although there are
some regulations that bind when a firm (or less often, a plant) reaches a lower threshold such
as 10 or 20 employees, 50 is generally agreed by labour lawyers and business people to be the
critical threshold when costs rise significantly”.
14. An increase in the contribution rate for continuing vocational training of 0.55% to 1.05%, an obligation of
monthly payments of social security contributions (instead of quarterly payments), an obligation for payment of transport
subsidies and the loss of the possibility of a simplified balance sheet.
15. There are more substantial discontinuities at the 50-employee threshold in the French legislation, notably
the possibility for employee unions of designating delegates, various obligations in the field of vocational training, the
obligation to set up a works council, the obligation to set up a separate committee on health, safety and working conditions,
the obligation to set up a “profits participation fund” in favor of employees, the obligation to set up “social plans”, i.e.
time-consuming and costly procedure in the event of redundancy involving nine or more employees, and the loss of the
possibility of a simplified presentation of the financial statements.
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3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
3.1. Data
We use administrative data from two main distinct sources:
• the Déclarations Administratives de Données Sociales (DADS) built by the French
Statistical Institute (INSEE) from the social contributions declarations of firms. Each year
firms declare the employment spells, the number of hours worked, and the associated wages
for each worker.
• the administrative file produced by the French Public Employment Service (Pôle emploi)
which administered the payment of the subsidy, designated as the “hiring credit file”. It
contains information on the firms which enrolled in the zéro charges program, the level of
the hiring wage, and the exact amount and duration of the subsidy received.
The DADS cover about 85% of French wage earners. Civil servants from the French central,
regional and local administrations (general government) and workers from the public health care
sector or employed by householders (e.g. for house-keeping or child care) do not appear in this
employment register (until 2009). We append the employment registers from 2005 to 2009,16
creating a panel of firms.17 We restrict the sample to firms in the for-profit private sector and
we drop the agricultural sector as well as associations. We also drop workers in temporary help
agencies, as we do not know in which firms they actually work, as well as the 1% of firms with the
highest employment growth rates in the sample. All relevant information pertaining to firm size,
the number of hires, separations, the wage levels and the duration of contracts is taken from the
DADS data set which describes the universe of firms relevant to our evaluation. We also compute
the eligibility condition based on the size threshold (full-time equivalent) from the employment
register, as the Public Employment Service computed it for the subsidized firms only.
Our two data sets can be matched using the firm identifier. This enables us to compute the
take-up rate, which corresponds to the fraction of small firms actually benefiting from the hiring
credit in 2009. The take-up rate amounts to 24%. This figure depends on the hiring rates of
low-wage workers and on the take-up behaviour conditional on hiring low-wage workers, which
we define as the attention rate. The attention rate (the share of subsidized hires among eligible
hires with wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage and contract duration above one month)
amounts to 47%. Figure 4 displays the take-up rate and the attention rate by firm size in 2008
(i.e. according to the eligibility criteria). The take-up rate sharply decreases for firms with eight
employees or more and goes to zero for firms larger than 12 employees. Similarly the attention
rate drops before the threshold and it is positive, around 3%, for firms with a workforce of 10–12
employees.
To the extent that, as discussed above, firms were not able to manipulate their size to meet
the eligibility criterion, the drop in the attention rate before the threshold of 10 employees and
the positive fraction of firms from 10 to 12 employees benefiting from the hiring credit are
likely the consequences of measurement error. The eligibility criterion is difficult to measure
precisely in the employment register at our disposal. In particular, according to the legal rules,
workers hired on permanent contracts are considered to be present in the firm from the beginning
of the month, even if they have been hired during the month. Since we only observe the type
16. The specification concerning the type of labour contract, either fixed-term or open-ended, is not available before
2005. Since the type of contract is used to compute the number of full time equivalent workers, as explained in footnote 12,
we cannot use the DADS before 2005.
17. There is no permanent identifier for individual workers. Our data are not a panel of individual workers.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/restud/article-abstract/86/2/593/4829925 by guest on 12 M
arch 2019
[11:33 2/2/2019 OP-REST180021.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 601 593–626
CAHUC ET AL. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIRING CREDITS 601
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
0 5 10 15 20
Full time equivalent employment in 2008
Take up rate Attention rate
Figure 4
Fraction of firms and of hires that benefited from the hiring credit by firm size in 2009.
Notes: The take-up rate is the share of firms below 10 employees benefiting from the hiring credit in 2009; the attention rate is the share
of hires with wages below 1.6 times the minimum wage lasting one month or more and which were subsidized in 2009. The number of
full-time equivalent employees is measured over the first 11 months of 2008.
of contract at the end of the year for every worker, we are unable to know whether workers
have been hired on permanent or temporary contracts because temporary contracts may have
been converted into permanent contracts. Another reason could be that computing the eligibility
criterion is a complex task, especially for small firms. Only ordinary employees are kept in the
size computation, excluding apprentices and diverse categories of employees benefiting from
other subsidies; employees contribute pro rata temporis but overtime hours are not taken into
account. These features of the eligibility criteria may induce firms to overestimate their size and
to refrain from claiming zéro charges. The resulting absence of discontinuity in the take-up rate
prevents us from using a regression discontinuity design.
3.2. Empirical strategy of the reduced-form approach
The hiring credit may influence employment through its impact on hires and on separations. To see
this, let us consider the law of motion of employment which determines the level of employment
at the end of the current period
L=L−1+H −S, (1)
where L−1 stands for employment inherited from the previous period, H denotes the number of
entries, and S is the number of separations.
Hiring credits aim at increasing employment through their effect on hires. However, it is
possible that firms benefit from important amounts of hiring credits while the effects on net
employment are negligible. Becker (2010) and Posner (2010), reacting to the Hiring Incentives
to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act passed in the U.S. in 2010, argued that it will increase
churning and wages with very little effect on employment. In our context, churning is potentially
an important concern to the extent that worker flows in excess of those strictly necessary to achieve
a given change in employment are large in France (Abowd et al., 1999; Cahuc et al., 2014).
If the hiring credit increases employment, it is nevertheless possible that its impact on hours
worked is limited, because firms have incentives to substitute hours of subsidized employees for
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those of non-subsidized employees. Therefore, it is also important to analyse the response of
hours of work.
In what follows, we estimate the impact of the hiring credit on employment, wages, hours
of work, hires and separations, using two different identification strategies: a difference-in-
differences strategy and an IV strategy. The difference-in-differences strategy contrasts the
evolution of employment in firms with fewer than 10 employees and firms with more than 10
employees before and after the reform was implemented. The IV strategy contrasts the evolution
of employment in employment pool × sector cells with high or low treatment intensity after
the reform was implemented. We instrument the treatment intensity by the share of low-wage
workers in the cell from 2006 to 2008 (before the reform).
4. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
This section presents the difference-in-differences econometric model and our main results on
the effects of the hiring credit on employment, hours worked, wages, hires, and separations.
4.1. Econometric model
We analyse yearly cohorts of firms. We select, for each cohort t, firms whose size criterion in
year t−1 is around the cut-off (i.e. 10 full-time equivalent employees, calculated as the average
of end-of-month pro-rata temporis headcounts between January and November of year t−1) and
estimate the following difference-in-differences model:
Yit =α+βZit +γ Dt +δZitDt +Xitb+uit, (2)
where Yit is the outcome of firm i in period t, Zit an eligibility dummy equal to 1 if the firm
size in period t−1 is below 10, Dt a dummy for year 2009 when subsidies can be claimed, Xit
a vector of covariates listed in the next section and in the note of Table 2. δ is our parameter of
interest. It captures the differential evolution of the group targeted by the hiring credit. It can be
interpreted as an Intention-To-Treat parameter. Accordingly, we refer, in this section, to firms
with fewer than 10 employees in year t−1 as our “treatment” group, even if they do not claim
the hiring credit. Note that because we define our eligibility dummy for every year, the treatment
effect estimate is robust to potential mean-reversion bias that could occur if the definitions of the
control and treatment groups had been based on the size of firms in 2008 only.18
In the benchmark estimations, the bandwidth goes from 6 (included) to 14 (excluded) full-time
employees in the previous year.19 In Table 1, we report characteristics of our 2009 cohort. These
characteristics are measured in 2008. In the first three columns, we compare small and medium
size firms. Small (i.e. eligible) firms operate less frequently in manufacturing industry and slightly
more often in retail, transport, and merchant services than non-eligible medium size firms. They
18. Let us consider the simple difference-in-differences model, without controls, using the 2008 and 2009 cohorts
of firms and with employment growth as an outcome. Then the difference between small and medium firms of the 2008
cohort writes: =E
[
L2008−L2007
L2007
|L2007 <10
]
−E
[
L2008−L2007
L2007
|L2007 >10
]
. If there is some mean-reversion bias around
10 employees,  would be strictly positive. Mean-reversion bias entails that the same difference using the 2009 cohort
would be strictly positive even in the absence of treatment effect. However taking the difference-in-differences nets
out the mean-reversion bias. Had we defined the treatment group according to the firm size in 2008, whatever the firm
cohort, any mean-reversion bias would have contaminated our difference-in-differences estimate. Year placebo estimates
in Supplementary Appendix C.1 confirm that our definition of the treatment group is robust to mean-reversion bias.
19. In Supplementary Appendix C.3, we present a robustness analysis where we vary the bandwidth around the
10-employee cutoff.
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TABLE 1
The characteristics in 2008 of eligible/ineligible and subsidized/unsubsidized firms
Eligible Ineligible Diff test Subsidized Not subsidized Diff test
No. of employees in 2008 6–10 10–14 p-value 6–10 6–10 p-value
Manufacturing 0.153 0.193 0.000 0.137 0.160 0.000
Construction 0.186 0.187 0.474 0.191 0.182 0.000
Retail and transport 0.307 0.288 0.000 0.319 0.302 0.000
Hotels and restaurants 0.100 0.091 0.000 0.143 0.083 0.000
Merchant services 0.254 0.244 0.000 0.208 0.272 0.000
Parisian area 0.241 0.229 0.000 0.154 0.275 0.000
North-West 0.245 0.254 0.000 0.265 0.237 0.000
North-East 0.120 0.124 0.032 0.128 0.116 0.000
South-East 0.268 0.264 0.185 0.307 0.253 0.000
South-West 0.127 0.129 0.382 0.146 0.119 0.000
Sales below 2 millions euros 0.449 0.204 0.000 0.519 0.422 0.000
Young firm (age below 5 years) 0.134 0.102 0.000 0.145 0.129 0.000
Mean share of ...
... male managers 0.207 0.216 0.000 0.161 0.225 0.000
... female managers 0.121 0.115 0.000 0.105 0.127 0.000
... male white-collar 0.079 0.076 0.004 0.093 0.074 0.000
... female white-collar 0.210 0.187 0.000 0.253 0.194 0.000
... male blue-collar 0.347 0.364 0.000 0.352 0.344 0.006
... female blue-collar 0.036 0.041 0.000 0.035 0.036 0.655
Mean share of ...
... low-wage workers 0.622 0.605 0.000 0.712 0.586 0.000
... part-time workers 0.256 0.208 0.000 0.258 0.255 0.039
No. of obs. 73,042 31,893 – 20,451 52,486 –
Notes: Low-wage workers earn between the minimum wage and 1.6 times this amount (on an hourly basis). Part-time
workers work below 80% of normal working hours. The number of employees corresponds to the full-time equivalent in
2008 (average from 1 January to 30 November). The number of observations corresponds to the number of firms in the
sample.
Source: DADS (Insee).
are slightly more frequently located in the Parisian area, and less frequently in the North West
and the North East parts of France. Almost half of small firms have sales of less than 2 million
euros, while four medium-size firms out of five exceed that mark. Small firms are also younger:
13% have existed for less than 5 years versus 10% for medium-size firms. The composition of
the workforce (in 2008) differs between small and medium-sized firms. Small firms have more
white-collar employees, while medium-sized firms have more blue-collar workers. Finally, the
share of low-paid workers and that of part-time workers are both higher in small firms. These
variables (lagged) are included in the regressions to control for these differences.
4.2. Main results
The validity of difference-in-differences estimations is heavily dependent on the common trend
assumption. We describe the common trend for treated firms with previous size between 6 and 10
(excluded) and control firms with previous size from 10 to 14 in Figure 5. The outcome is average
employment growth in each group.20 Employment is computed at the firm level. Employment
in year t is defined as employment on 30 November of year t. This ensures that employment in
20. We focus on the effect of the hiring credit on the growth rate of employment rather than on the employment
level for the following reason. The common trend assumption on the employment level requires identical differences in
employment levels between year t and year t−1 for the control and the treatment group before 2009, i.e. L¯Ct −L¯Ct−1 =
L¯Tt − L¯Tt−1 where L¯jt stands for average employment of group j (j=C for the control group and j=T for the treatment
group) in year t <2009. We checked that this assumption is not fulfilled. This is not surprising inasmuch as the impact
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Figure 5
Average employment growth rate in firms in the treated and control groups.
Notes: Growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t−1 and year t. The treatment group comprises firms of size between 6
(included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November). The control
group comprises firms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from
1 December to 30 November).
2008 is not influenced by the hiring credit that was announced on 4 December 2008. Let Li,t
denote employment in firm i on 30 November of year t; average employment growth for each
group is 1Nt
∑
i
Li,t−Li,t−1
Li,t−1 where Nt is the number of firms in the group. Figure 5 shows that the
difference in employment growth rates between the treatment group and the control group is
negative and constant from 2006 to 2008. In 2009, this difference becomes positive: the growth
rate of the treatment group drops by 0.9 percentage points while that of the control group drops
by 1.6 percentage points.21 Figure 6 shows that the same phenomenon arises for hours of work:
the average growth rate of total hours of work per firm of the treatment group is below that of the
control group from 2006 to 2008 and becomes larger than that of the control group in 2009. This
points to positive treatment effects, that we estimate below.
In Table 2, we present our difference-in-differences estimates for different outcomes (in rows)
and specifications (in columns). In column 1, our baseline sample comprises all cohorts from 2006
to 2009 without covariates. In column 2, we add covariates control which include year, sector
of productivity shocks or labour costs shocks on the employment level are expected to increase with the size of the firm.
This is the case, for instance, when the wage elasticity of labour demand is constant. To see this, consider a simple static
model, where the production function is F(L) and the labour cost is equal to the net wage w times the labour wedge φ.
The optimal level of employment satisfies F ′(L)=wφ. This equation implies that a one percent change in labour cost
induces a change in employment level that is proportional to the initial employment level of the firm, i.e. dL=Lεdφ/φ,
where ε=F ′(L)/LF ′′(L) denotes the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the labour cost wφ. Note that taking log
employment as outcome instead of the employment growth rate is valid only if the distribution of past employment is
stable over cohorts of the control and the treatment groups. Running diff-in-diff on growth rates allows us to get estimates
that are robust to potential changes in the distribution of past employment since the change in employment of each firm
is proportional to its past size.
21. The average employment growth is negative for the treatment group and the control group all along the period.
This is because new entrants, which typically account for a significant share of employment growth, are excluded from
the sample. Bear in mind that, by construction, we cannot include new entrants since we study the behaviour of firms that
had between 6 and 14 full time equivalent employees the previous year.
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Figure 6
Average hours growth rate in firms in the treated and control groups.
Notes: Growth rate of the number of hours worked within each firm between November of year t and November of year t−1. The treatment
group comprises firms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from
1 December to 30 November). The control group comprises firms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full-time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 December to 30 November).
and regions dummies, as well as their interactions, dummies for firm age, for firms with sales
below 2 million euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the
previous year and the shares of female or male workers with different occupations (managers,
white-collar or blue-collar workers). In column 3, we restrict the sample to cohorts 2008 and
2009 (to avoid potential specification errors related to underlying trends). To deal with serial
correlation problems which could lead to misleadingly small standard errors (Bertrand et al.,
2004), we follow the approach suggested by Cameron and Miller (2015): in addition to the non-
clustered robust standard errors, we compute the cluster-robust standard errors at progressively
broader levels, starting at the firm level, then at the employment pool × sector unit level, and
eventually at the employment pool level.
The results are very stable. They indicate that the hiring credit increased the employment
growth rate of the treatment group by about 0.8 percentage point (column 2 of Table 2). Table 2
shows that the impact of the hiring credit on the growth of hours of work is similar to that on
employment, indicating that firms did not reduce working hours on existing jobs to compensate
for new hires. The last row of Table 2 shows that the hiring credit had no impact on the survival
of firms, meaning that the hiring credit raised employment in surviving firms. Indeed, estimates
on the subsample of surviving firms are identical to that of all firms, as shown in Table A11 in
Supplementary Appendix.22
Table 3 displays separately the impact of the hiring credit on eligible jobs—jobs paying below
1.6 times the minimum wage that last at least one month—and on ineligible jobs.23 The hiring
22. Our estimates are not weighted by firm size. This could bias our results if, for instance, the elasticity of labour
demand depends on the size of firms. We checked that estimates provided in the course of the paper yield results similar
to weighted estimates. This is illustrated by Table A12 in Supplementary Appendix which shows the weighted estimates
corresponding to those displayed in Table 2.
23. The number of observations in Table 3 is smaller than in Table 2 because it excludes firms with eligible jobs
only and firms with ineligible jobs only. The last column of Table 3 displays the difference-in-differences estimates for
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TABLE 2
Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on various labour market outcomes in 2009
Cohorts 2006–9 2006–9 2008–9
Covariates No Yes Yes
Emp. growth 0.009
∗∗∗
(0.002;0.002;0.002;0.002)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002;0.002;0.002;0.002)
0.009∗∗∗
(0.002;0.002;0.002;0.002)
Hours growth 0.010
∗∗∗
(0.002;0.002;0.002;0.002)
0.009∗∗∗
(0.002;0.002;0.002;0.002)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002;0.002;0.002;0.002)
Hiring rate 0.014
∗∗∗
(0.005;0.004;0.004;0.004)
0.012∗∗∗
(0.004;0.004;0.004;0.004)
0.019∗∗∗
(0.005;0.004;0.004;0.004)
Sep. rate 0.005(0.005;0.004;0.004;0.004)
0.004
(0.004;0.004;0.004;0.004)
0.010∗∗
(0.005;0.004;0.004;0.004)
Survival rate 0.000(0.001;0.001;0.001;0.001)
0.000
(0.001;0.001;0.001;0.001)
−0.001
(0.001;0.001;0.001;0.001)
No. of Obs 406,468 406,468 207,379
Notes: This table presents our difference-in-differences estimates for different outcomes (rows) and different specifications
(columns). The treatment group comprises firms of size between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). The control group comprises firms of size
between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to
30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of employment between 30 November of year t−1 and year t;
the growth rate of the number of hours worked between November of year t−1 and November of year t; the number of
hires from 1 December of year t−1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t−1; the
number of separations from 1 December of year t−1 to 30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November
of year t−1; the survival rate from 30 November year t−1 to 30 November year t. We define firms as survivors if they
have at least one employee paid at the end of November in year t. As covariates, we include year, sector and regions
dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for firm age, firms with sales below 2 million euros in the
previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female or male workers
with different occupations (managers, white-collar or blue-collar workers). Standard errors in parentheses, respectively,
not clustered, clustered at the firm level, at the employment pool X sector level, at the employment pool level. There are
348 employment pools (“zones d’emploi”, Insee) and 5 sectors. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant
at 1%.
Source: DADS (Insee).
credit has a strong positive and significant impact on employment and hours for eligible jobs
only. The impact for non eligible jobs is rather positive, but not significantly different from zero.
This means that the hiring credit has had a positive impact on total employment and total hours
mainly through its impact on eligible jobs, and very marginally on ineligible jobs.
4.3. Robustness checks
Our data set allows us to observe the evolution of employment month-by-month from 2006 to
2011. We use this information to exhibit the common trends of employment growth between
small and medium-sized firms at the monthly level, before the introduction of the policy.
We compute the average employment growth from November of year t−1 to the end of
month m in year t for both small and medium firms according to their size in year t−1. We
denote the average employment growths for small and medium-sized firms by g1m,t and g0m,t
respectively.
We then estimate, for every month from 2007 to 2009, the corresponding difference-in-
differences coefficients: g1m,t −g0m,t −(g1m,t−1−g0m,t−1). Since there is no policy change from
January 2007 to November 2008 (last month before the announcement of the policy), the
difference-in-differences estimates provide placebo tests, as they should be 0 over this period.
all jobs with this smaller sample. Results are identical to those displayed in Table 2, corresponding to the full sample also
comprising firms without jobs either below or above 1.6 times the minimum wage.
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TABLE 3
Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the hiring credit for eligible and ineligible jobs on various labour
market outcomes in 2009
Eligible jobs Ineligible jobs All jobs
Employment growth 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
Hours growth 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.005
(0.004)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.002)
Hiring rate 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.005
(0.008)
0.008∗∗
(0.004)
Separation rate 0.000
(0.004)
0.003
(0.008)
0.000
(0.004)
No. of Observations 350,633 350,633 350,633
Notes: This table presents our difference-in-differences estimates for different outcomes (rows) and different types of
jobs (columns): eligible jobs below 1.6 times the minimum wage that last at least one month; ineligible jobs above
1.6 times the minimum wage or that last less than one month; all jobs. The treatment group comprises firms of size
between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to
30 November). The control group comprises firms of size between 10 (included) and 14 (excluded) full time equivalent
employees in the previous year (average from 1 January to 30 November). We consider as outcomes the growth rate of
employment between 30 November of year t−1 and year t; the growth rate of the number of hours worked between
November of year t−1 and November of year t; the number of hires from 1 December of year t−1 to 30 November of
year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t−1; the number of separations from 1 December of year t−1 to
30 November of year t divided by employment on 30 November of year t−1; as covariates, we include year, sector and
regions dummies, as well as their interactions; we also include dummies for firm age, firms with sales below 2 million
euros in the previous year, the share of low-wage and part-time workers in the previous year and the shares of female
or male workers with different occupations (managers, white-collar, or blue-collar workers). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Source: DADS (Insee).
Figure 7 shows that there is indeed no differential employment evolution between small and
medium-sized firms. This figure is a further check of the common trend at annual frequency
shown in Figure 5. Supplementary Appendix C provides year placebo tests on other outcomes,
as well as other robustness checks (placebo size cutoffs, and changes in the selection of the
estimation sample).
Figure 7 also sheds light on the adjustment of employment in 2009. The estimated impact of
the hiring credit increases steadily over the year.24 It is clear that zéro charges has had a significant
and quick impact on employment, since the difference-in-differences estimates are positive, at
95% level of confidence, from the end of February 2009—three months after the start of the
policy. This result is in line with the literature on dynamic labour demand, according to which
employment reacts quickly to shocks on labour costs, with a delay that is clearly infra-annual
(Hamermesh, 2013).
Figure 7 also reports difference-in-differences estimates for 2010 and 2011. To use only the
pre-treatment period as reference to compute the differential evolution of the employment growth
rate between small and medium sized firms over these two years, we then define the difference-
in-differences estimate for month m of year t as g1m,t −g0m,t −
(
g1m,2008−g0m,2008
)
. It is important
to remark that these difference-in-differences estimates do not allow us to evaluate the impact
of zero charges properly. As explained above, the government announced on 16 November 2009
that the policy, which was initially designed to stop on 31 December 2009, was extended to hires
occurring up to 30 June 2010. Firms below the average of 10 full-time equivalent employees from
January 2009 to December 2009 were eligible for the extended program for their new hires in
2010. In this context, the difference-in-differences method is not appropriate to properly identify
the effects of the policy in 2010, as some firms treated in 2009 may not have been able to apply in
24. It reaches 0.009 in November 2009, which is by construction consistent with Column 3 in Table 2.
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Figure 7
Difference-in-differences estimates on the employment growth rate at the monthly frequency.
Notes: Each point plots the monthly difference-in-differences estimate of employment growth rates between small and medium firms. The
employment growth rate of month m of year t is the average employment growth from November of year t−1 to the end of month m in year
t, for both small and medium-sized firms according to their size in year t−1. The DiD estimates of each year t is computed using relevant
reference years. The reference year is 2006 for the 2007 DiD estimates, 2007 for the 2008 DiD estimates, and 2008 for DiD estimates
of years 2009, 2010 and 2011. The estimates are obtained in a regression controlling for the same covariates as in column 3 of Table 2
and where standard errors are robust. The 2009 DiD estimates capture the impact of the 2009 hiring credits. The DiD estimates of years
2007 and 2008 are placebo tests of the common trend assumption. The DiD estimates of years 2010 and 2011 are potentially biased by
endogenous selection into treatment groups for the 2010 extension of the hiring credit as discussed in the main text.
2010, because eligibility for the extended period was then based on the average size over 2009.25
Moreover, firms could have manipulated the eligibility criteria for the 2010 extension in December
2009: firms above the 10 employees threshold in November 2009 had an incentive to downsize.
For this reason, the paper is focused on the impact of zéro charges until November 2009.
That being said, Figure 7 shows that the difference-in-differences estimates are lower in
2010 than in 2009, and only marginally significant for the first semester in 2010. Small firms
which already benefited from the hiring credit in 2009 did not experience any policy change in
December 2009, and thus did not grow beyond their already high employment levels of 2009. This
explains the sharp drop in the difference-in-differences estimates in January 2010, which capture
the effect of the hiring credit on the employment growth from November 2009 to January 2010.
Then, during the second semester of 2010, difference-in-differences estimates are not statistically
significant. They are marginally lower than during the first semester, capturing the reaction of
firms to the disappearance of the hiring credit. More interestingly, we do not find any significant
intertemporal substitution effects, which would have implied significantly slower growth of small
firms after the credit ends. However, insofar as the difference-in-differences estimates are probably
biased after 2009, they are not relevant to properly identify intertemporal substitution effects
either. Supplementary Appendix Table A13 comprises another test which points to the absence
of substitution effects: it shows that there is no evidence of different employment effects of the
hiring subsidy between service sectors and other sectors in which production can be more easily
substituted from one period to another, thanks to storage.
25. Similarly, the policy extension announced in 2009 may have affected the firm size distribution in 2010 and
consequently the split between medium and small size groups in the computation of the difference-in-difference estimates
for 2011.
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4.4. Evaluation of the employment elasticity
Since the hiring credit decreased the total labour cost of firms in the treatment group by 0.2%26
and increased total employment by 0.8%, our estimates point to an employment elasticity with
respect to the change in labour cost induced by the hiring credit of around −4, belonging to the
95% confidence interval [−6,−2].
The strong employment impact of zero charges relies on the absence of wage increases and
on the absence of increased churning of workers, as shown in Supplementary Appendices A
and B. Even if wages and labour turnover did not increase, this figure may at first sight
seem incredibly high, compared to usual estimates of labour demand elasticities. For instance,
Kramarz and Philippon (2001) and Abowd et al. (2006) found that the elasticity of employment
with respect to the minimum wage is about −2 for men and −1.5 for women in France.
Crépon and Desplatz (2001), using a different empirical strategy, found an elasticity equal to −0.8
for workers close to the minimum wage. The strong employment impact is not due to an intertem-
poral substitution effect, where firms would have frontloaded hires before the end of the first hiring
credit period. We verify that the effect is still as strong in the service industries where production
cannot be easily re-scheduled and buffered using inventories (see Supplementary Appendix
Table A13).
The strong employment impact of zéro charges can be explained by the fact that a temporary
decrease in average labour cost can have stronger employment effects when it is induced by a
hiring credit than by wage changes that apply to all employees. To show this, let ε stand for the
elasticity of contemporaneous employment, L, when the change in average labour cost per worker
is due to a temporary change in the wage cost w of all incumbent and entrant workers. This is the
standard definition of labour demand elasticity when the payroll equals wL. Let εσ stand for the
elasticity of employment with respect to the average labour cost per worker when the change in
average labour cost per worker is due to zéro charges. Bear in mind that the hiring credit alters
the cost of entrants (i.e. new hires) only. The relation between employment and hires is given by
the law of motion of employment (1). Let us assume that ε is identical in all firms and that the
hiring credit does not increase churning of workers and wages, which is the case for zéro charges
as shown in Supplementary Appendices A and B. We get (see Supplementary Appendix F.1.1 for
computation details):
ε=ηεσ , (3)
where η is the share of employees that benefit from the hiring credit on 30 November 2009 in
firms with positive take-up of zéro charges. As long as η<1, the employment elasticity induced
by the hiring credit is larger, in absolute value, than that induced by a proportional change in the
wage cost of all workers. The reason is that subsidizing the jobs of incumbent workers yields no
employment effects in firms that do not layoff workers absent the subsidy: all it does is to create
windfalls for these firms. Using hiring credits is a means to target subsidies at marginal jobs,
which yields positive employment effects, without providing subsidies to incumbent workers,
which yields no employment effects in these firms.27 In the limit case where η=1 (which would
happen if the take-up rate were 100% and the whole workforce were renewed over the course of
26. In November 2009, firms in the treatment group got 3.6 million euros from zéro charges while their labour cost
during that month was 1.75 billion euros, which corresponds to a decrease of 0.21% in labour cost. Over the course of
year 2009, zéro charges decreased the labour cost of firms in the treatment group by 0.14%. The amount of subsidies
paid by zéro charges increased progressively during 2009.
27. It should be noticed that wage subsidies can lower job destruction (Schoefer, 2015). Since most job separations
affect workers of low tenure, who potentially benefit from the hiring credit, the differential impact of hiring credits and
wage subsidies on job separations is an open question left for future research.
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a year), the two elasticities are identical because the entire workforce of firms that benefit from
the hiring credit is subsidized.
All in all, we find that ε, the elasticity of employment with respect to labour cost induced
by a change in wage, is smaller, in absolute value, than when the labour cost is modified by
the hiring credit. The 95% interval confidence of the elasticity ε is [−1.5,−0.5],28 which is
in line with previous estimates obtained for France. We show in Supplementary Appendix C.3
that this estimate is likely a lower bound for the absolute value of the elasticity of employment,
which becomes larger when the difference-in-differences model is estimated with bandwidths
that exclude firms with positive take-up rates from the control group.
5. IV STRATEGY: VARIATIONS IN TREATMENT INTENSITY ACROSS
LABOUR MARKETS
The validity of the difference-in-differences identification strategy relies on the assumption that
medium-sized firms—our control group—are not affected by the policy. This assumption is
questionable. First, the supplementary hires induced by the hiring credit might increase labour
market tightness (vacancies/unemployment ratio) and thus the recruiting costs for all firms.
Second, the hiring credit may also increase wages in all firms. In our context, it is unlikely
that the control group has been affected by the hiring credit to the extent that the hiring credit
subsidized about 1% of all jobs only in the economy.29 Nevertheless, to deal with this issue,
we implement an alternative identification strategy which does not rely on the assumption that
medium-sized firms have not been impacted by the policy. We exploit variations in the treatment
intensity across local sector-specific labour markets.
5.1. Econometric model
We group firms into cells wherein the intensity of the treatment differed. Cells are defined as
sectors in employment pools (or commuting zones). We distinguish 348 employment pools,30
and 5 sectors (manufacturing, construction, retail and transport, hotels and restaurants, and other
merchant services). We propose to use variation in treatment intensity across cells to estimate
the impact of the hiring credit on employment among eligible firms. Treatment intensity can be
measured by the share of subsidized hires among small firms in each cell. In cells where there is
a larger share of subsidized hires among small firms, zéro charges should entail a larger effect on
the growth rate of employment among these firms.31 Formally, our equation of interest is:
Y2009jk =α+δIjk +γ Y2008jk +βXjk +vjk, (4)
28. The share of employees that benefit from the hiring credit on 30 November 2009 in firms with positive take-
up of zéro charges amounts to 0.26 which implies that ε=−4×0.26−1 with a 95% confidence interval equal to
[−1.5,−0.5].
29. About 20% of workers are employed in firms with fewer than 10 employees. The take-up rate of zéro charges
amounts to 24%, and 26% of workers employed on 30 November 2009 in firms with positive take-up benefit from the hiring
credit. Thus, the share of jobs that benefit from zéro charges in November 2009 was equal to 0.20×0.24×0.26=1.2%.
30. We use the 348 zones d’emploi provided by INSEE, the French national statistical office. A zone d’emploi is
a geographic area wherein most workers reside and work, and in which companies can find most of the labour needed
for the jobs offered. The definition of zone d’emploi is based on the flow of commuting workers observed in the 2006
Census.
31. This design was used to evaluate the effect of the federal minimum wage in the U.S. using cross-state variation
in the fraction of low wage workers (Card, 1992).
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where Y2009jk is the employment growth rate
32 between November 2008 and November 2009
averaged across eligible firms (with 6 to 10 employees in 2008) in commuting zone j and producing
in sector k, Y2008jk is the lagged outcome, Ijk is the share of subsidized hires among all hires in
2009 in small firms and captures the treatment intensity, Xjk is a set of controls at the cell level.
The share of subsidized hires may be correlated with the error term vjk to the extent that the
take-up rate is endogenous. As an instrument for the treatment intensity, we use the share of
eligible hires (below 1.6 the minimum wage) in small firms averaged from 2006 to 2008. Note
that this share is measured before the introduction of the program. The share of eligible hires in
2009 would probably be more correlated with treatment intensity but it is also endogenous, since
firms can always shift their wage offers to be eligible for the hiring credit. Therefore it cannot be
used as an instrument.
One concern with our instrument could be that it also affects employment growth directly.
For example, this would be the case if the business cycle has differential effects for low-wage or
high-wage workers. To limit this concern, we include, as an independent variable, a shift-share
prediction of employment growth from 2008 to 2009 in the same cell. In every cell jk, we measure
the 2008 share of employment in the sub-industries l of sector k, which we denote Sljk . Then,
for every two-digit industry l, we compute the national employment growth from 2008 to 2009
in firms below 50 employees, excluding the commuting zone j: gl−j. The shift-share prediction
writes: l∈k Sljkg
l−j. To further control for local shocks, we introduce as independent variables
the lagged employment growth from 2007 to 2008 of small firms in the commuting zones around
the cell of interest, both producing in the same sector and in the other sectors. The set of controls
Xjk also includes sector dummies and some key cell characteristics measured in the previous year
as in the difference-in-differences strategy: the distribution of firms’ age, the (log) cell size, the
share of firms with sales below 2 million euros, the share of part-time workers and the share
of female/male executive/white-collar/blue-collar workers. It also includes cell-level measures
of sales/value-added/dividends per employee and of financial leverage (i.e. debt over equity),
averaged over the pre-policy period from 2005 to 2008.33 These balance sheet data come from
the French tax returns FICUS/FARE.
The IV strategy can only succeed if there is variation in the share of low-pay hires across
employment pool × sector cells. This is the case as shown in Figure 8, which displays the
distribution of this share among the 348 employment pool × 5 sector cells in our sample (i.e.
around 1720 observations, in total, given that some pools do not feature all sectors). The 2006–8
average share of eligible hires among small firms (with 6 to 10 employees to be consistent with
our baseline estimates) averages 0.575 with a standard deviation of 0.093.
5.2. Results
We first estimate equation (4) using weighted OLS, where weights are the employment size of
each cell as measured among 6–10 employees firms in 2008. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that
a higher share of subsidized hires is associated with a higher growth rate of employment. However,
the presence of confounding variables, influencing the employment growth rate and the share of
subsidized hires, can imply that OLS estimates are biased. For instance, commuting zones where
32. Henceforth, we focus on employment for the sake of clarity. Results on hours of work, which are not statistically
different from those obtained on employment, are consistent with those obtained with the difference-in-differences
strategy.
33. The debt-over-equity ratio is a commonly-used measure of financial leverage in the literature (see the recent
example in Giroud and Mueller, 2017).
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Figure 8
Density of the share of eligible hires from 2006 to 2008 among small firms.
TABLE 4
Cross-unit estimates of the impact of the hiring credit on employment growth rates in 2009, based on OLS and IV
OLS IV-2SLS
Covariates No Yes No Yes
First stage
Share of subsidized hires (Ijk)
Share of eligible hires in 2006-2008 0.519∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.036)
R2 0.294 0.392
Second stage
Employment growth
Share of subsidized hires (Ijk) 0.029∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.069)
R2 0.006 0.057
No. of Observations 1,721 1,721 1,721 1,721
Notes: This table presents estimates based on cross-cell differences in the intensity of treatment in 2009. Each cell
corresponds to one employment pool and one sector. Within each cell the treatment group comprises firms of size
between 6 (included) and 10 (excluded) full-time equivalent employees in the previous year (average from 1 January
to 30 November). Each cell is weighted by its relative employment size as measured among 6–10 employees firms. We
consider as outcome the growth rate of employment between 30 November of 2008 and 2009. We control for the lagged
employment growth rate from 2007 to 2008. The share of subsidized hires in 2009 is instrumented by the average share
of eligible hires (i.e. hires in small firms with wages between the minimum wage and 1.6 times the minimum wage) in
the corresponding cell from 2006 to 2008. Covariates include a shift-share prediction of employment growth from 2008
to 2009 in the same cell, and the lagged employment growth from 2007 to 2008 of small firms in the commuting zones
around the cell of interest. The set of controls also includes sector dummies and some key cell characteristics measured
in the previous year: the distribution of firms’ age, the (log) cell size, the share of firms with sales below 2 million euros,
the share of part-time workers and the share of female/male executive/white-collar/blue-collar workers. It also includes
cell-level measures of sales/value-added/dividends per employee and of financial leverage (debt over equity), averaged
over the pre-policy period from 2005 to 2008. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%, **Significant
at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Source: DADS and FICUS/FARE (Insee), Pole emploi.
entrepreneurs are more dynamic may create more jobs and may have lower take-up rates of the
hiring credit because their opportunity cost of applying for the hiring credit is higher. Columns 3
and 4 of Table 4 show the results of the IV estimation. The upper panel reports the estimates of
the first stage. It shows that the share of eligible hires from 2006 to 2008 is a strong predictor of
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the treatment intensity in 2009. The coefficients of the second-stage estimation, reported in the
bottom panel, are larger than those obtained with OLS, and they are consistent with the estimates
obtained with the difference-in-differences strategy.34 We checked that restricting the sample
to cells with at least 10, or 30 firms between 6 and 10 employees, does not alter these results.
Supplementary Appendix C provides year placebo tests.
To check further that our two identification strategies yield consistent results, we regress the
difference-in-differences equation (2) on the sample made of the employment pool × sector
units. To do so, for each unit and each year we compute the average growth rates of employment
and hours worked separately for the two groups of firms (treatment or control). We weight each
employment pool × sector unit by its employment size among firms from 6 to 14 full-time
equivalent employees in the previous year. The results, in Supplementary Appendix Table A14,
are similar to those of Table 2. If we restrict our sample to employment pool × sector units with
at least 10, or 20 firms with 6 to 10 employees present in a given year, results remain unchanged.
6. EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS
Our previous results suggest that medium-sized firms have not been affected by the hiring credit
targeted at small-sized firms to the extent that we find consistent results with the difference-in-
differences and the IV identification strategies. Nevertheless, to shed more light on this issue, we
check whether employment and wages of firms above 10 employees, as well as the duration of
vacancies have been impacted by the share of subsidized hires in their employment pool × sector
cell. If there are equilibrium effects that reduce the net impact of the hiring credit, we should
observe lower growth rates of employment among non-eligible firms in cells with a higher share
of subsidized hires. Similarly, we should observe either higher wage growth or longer vacancy
duration in cells with a higher share of subsidized hires. We adopt the same definition of cells as
in the previous section (348 commuting zones × 5 sectors).
Within each of the 1,720 employment pool × sector units for which we have observations
in both the treatment and the control groups for 2008 and 2009 (i.e. 1675 observations, in total),
we compute the ratio of subsidized hires in 2009 to all hires observed in the same year among
firms with 0 to 20 full-time equivalent employees in 2008, denoted Sjk , where j stands for the
employment pool and k for the sector. The average value of Sjk, is 0.182, and its standard
deviation is 0.085. We also compute for each unit the average growth rate of employment and
of wages from November 2008 to November 2009 among firms having from 10 to 20 full-time
equivalent employees in the previous year.35 Using data on vacancies posted at the French Public
Employment Service, we compute the average time needed to fill vacancies posted in 2009 for
each unit. We then compare the labour market outcomes across units with different shares of
subsidized hires. To achieve this, we estimate the following model:
Y2009jk =α+λSjk +γ Y2008jk +βXjk +ujk, (5)
where Y2009jk stands for our outcome of interest in 2009 in employment pool j and sector k, Y2008jk
its value in the previous year, Sjk is the share of hires in the cell subsidized by the 2009 hiring
34. To compare these estimates with the benchmark intention to treat estimates obtained in Table 2, one needs to
account for the share of subsidized hires among small firms. In our sample, the weighted average value of this share
is 0.17. Using the value of the coefficient of the fourth column of Table 4 this leads to effects at the mean value of
0.17×0.138=0.023 on the employment growth rate with 95% interval confidence [0.001,0.046].
35. To control for differential selection into employment across unit, we restrict the wage computation to workers
who were both employed in 2008 and in 2009 (see Supplementary Appendix A for more details on wages data).
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TABLE 5
Cross-unit estimates of equilibrium effects on the employment and wage growth rates of firms with 10–20 employees
and on the vacancy duration, based on OLS and IV
OLS IV 2SLS - Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment growth 0.073∗∗∗ 0.027 0.118∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.051)
Wage growth 0.110∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.021) (0.012) (0.026) (0.035)
Vacancy duration (log) −0.184 0.033 −0.529∗∗∗ −0.037
(0.145) (0.054) (0.157) (0.142)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
No. of Observations 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675
Notes: This table presents estimates based on cross-cell difference in treatment intensity in 2009. Each cell is one sector
in one commuting zone. The treatment intensity is measured as the ratio of subsidized hires in 2009 over total hires in
the same year among firms smaller than 20 employees. The dependent variable is either the employment growth of firms
sized 10–20 in the previous year (line 1), or the wage growth of their employees (line 2), or the average vacancy duration
in 2009 in the cell (line 3). In the IV regressions, the treatment intensity is instrumented by the corresponding shares of
eligible hires, i.e. the ratios of the eligible hires in 2008 to total hires in the same year among firms with 0 to 20 full-time
employees in the previous year, averaged from 2006 to 2008. Covariates include a shift-share prediction of employment
growth from 2008 to 2009 in the same cell, and the lagged outcome. The set of controls also includes sector dummies and
some key cell characteristics measured in 2008: the distribution of firms’ age, the (log) cell size, the share of firms with
sales below 2 million euros, the share of part-time workers and the share of female/male executive/white-collar/blue-
collar workers. It also includes cell-level measures of sales/value-added/dividends per employee and of financial leverage
(debt over equity), averaged over the pre-policy period from 2005 to 2008. Weights are used: for each employment pool
x sector unit the weight equals total employment among firms with less than 14 full-time equivalent employees in the
previous year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Source: DADS and FICUS/FARE (Insee), Pole emploi.
credit. The term ujk is a residual. We include the same set of control variables Xjk as in the IV
strategy of the previous section.
As in the previous section, the number of subsidized hires in 2009 might be affected by
unobserved shocks that also affect employment of medium-sized firms, meaning that the ratio Sjk
of subsidized hires in 2009 is potentially endogenous in equation (5). For this reason, the ratio Sjk
of subsidized hires in 2009 is instrumented by the corresponding average share of eligible hires
from 2006 to 2008 (when the subsidy was not yet implemented), denoted Ejk .
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the results of the OLS estimation of equation (5), one row
for each outcome. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the IV estimation. Focusing on the results
for employment growth and wage growth (first two rows), there is a statistically significant positive
correlation between the share of subsidized hires in 2009 and the growth rates of employment
and wages in 2009, when we do not add any controls (column 1). Without any controls, the
IV estimates are also statistically significant (column 3). However, as we add controls, the OLS
and IV estimates are smaller and no longer statistically significant—except at the 10% level for
the OLS estimate on wages. Concerning the vacancy duration, we do not find any statistically
significant effect of the local share of subsidized hires, once we add controls and instrument the
share of subsidized hires. Table 6, which presents the first stage of the IV estimation shows that
the shares of subsidized hires in 2009 are strongly correlated with the instruments. These results
remain unchanged if we restrict our sample to all employment pool × sector cells with at least
10 or 30 firms. In Supplementary Appendix C.4, we show that we do not find any equilibrium
effects when we allow the spillovers to go beyond the boundaries of the commuting zone × sector
cell. All in all, these results suggest that the hiring credit had no impact on the medium-sized
firms.
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TABLE 6
First stage of the instrumental variable estimates of equilibrium effects
IV 2SLS - First stage
Share of subsidized hires (Sjk)
Share of eligible hires in 2006–8 (Ejk) 0.597∗∗∗(0.028)
0.439∗∗∗
(0.042)
R2 0.478 0.593
Covariates No Yes
No. of Observations 1,675 1,675
Notes: This table presents the first stage of the IV estimation of equation (5). We regress, at the cell level, the share of
subsidized hires in 2009 on the share of eligible hires in the same year—among firms smaller than 20 employees. We use
the same covariates and weights, as in Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%, **Significant
at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Source: DADS and FICUS/FARE (Insee), Pole emploi.
7. COSTS PER JOB CREATED
In this section, we first compute the cost per job created by zéro charges under the assumption that
there are no equilibrium effects. This assumption is consistent with the results of Section 6. Only a
small share of firms were eligible for this temporary hiring credit, in a context where the minimum
wage was binding and unemployment was high, so that we do not observe any equilibrium effects.
In the second part of this section, we estimate the parameters of a structural search and matching
model to simulate how equilibrium effects could affect the cost per job created, if the hiring credit
were implemented in different economic environments, at different scales and on different time
spans. A potential concern with this approach is that the estimation of the structural parameters
of the search and matching model relies on the behaviour of small-sized firms following a shock
on low wages. In this context, empirical evidence suggests that our estimates would rather yield
a lower bound of cost per job created.36
7.1. Cost per job created by zéro charges
Based on our estimates, it is possible to compute the gross cost per job created by the hiring credit
in the treatment group. The cost per job created by the hiring credit, cσ , is a simple function of the
contemporaneous wage w and of the employment elasticity with respect to the change in average
labour cost induced by the hiring credit (see Supplementary Appendix F.1.1):
cσ =− w
εσ
. (6)
Since we estimated that εσ =−4, this formula also indicates that the cost per job created is equal
to 25% of the cost of a job. Accordingly, at the end of 2009, the monthly cost of creating one job
amounts to around 700 euros.37
36. Empirical evidence shows that the labour demand for low-skilled workers is more elastic (Hamermesh, 2013;
Lichter et al. 2015). Therefore, if the credit had concerned all types of workers, we expect the cost per job created to be
higher. Second, there is far less empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of labour demand elasticity by firm size. That
being said, we can expect large firms to be more capital intensive. The standard labour demand theory of Cobb–Douglas
firms predicts that the short-run labour demand elasticity decreases with the capital intensity of the firm. Then the cost
per job created estimated on small firms is probably a lower bound of the cost of a similar hiring credits, independent of
firm size.
37. Alternatively, we can directly compute the cost per job created from the treatment effect estimate. There are
646,717 jobs in the treatment group at the end of 2008 (cf. Supplementary Appendix). According to Table 2, our estimate
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This is a gross cost, because it ignores the savings generated by job creation in terms of
unemployment and other social benefits that would have been paid in the absence of the measure.
It also ignores the remaining social contributions paid by employees on these additional jobs.
We exploit a survey, presented in Supplementary Appendix D, which allows us to precisely
evaluate the savings permitted by zéro charges on social benefits. To this end we rely on two
key assumptions. First, consistent with our estimation of the impact of zéro charges on net job
creation, we assume that the number of jobs created by zéro charges reduced non-employment
by the same amount. Second, we assume that social benefits would have been paid to individuals
identical to the beneficiaries of zéro charges if they had remained on the dole. We find that the
savings amount to about 700 euros per month. This makes the net cost of the hiring credit per
created job equal to zero.38
7.2. The search and matching model
The previous estimated costs hold for a small and temporary hiring credit program which
subsidized about 1% of all jobs in the economy and had no equilibrium effects. Moreover, this
hiring credit was implemented during a recession, in a context where the minimum wage was
binding and unemployment was high. A hiring credit covering more hires or occurring in different
environments might entail equilibrium effects which could change significantly the impact of the
policy, as suggested by Beaudry et al. (2012, 2014), Crépon et al. (2013), Gautier et al. (2012),
and Lalive et al. (2013). To shed light on this issue, we estimate a search and matching model
which enables us to account for equilibrium effects.
7.2.1. Model description. We consider a discrete time economy with a large number
of labour pools or “islands” in which a representative firm produces a differentiated product
with labour only as in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model. The revenue function of the firm in
period t is equal to AtR(Lt), where R is an increasing and concave function homogeneous of
degree (1+α), such that R(Lt)=(Lt)1+α/(1+α), and At >0 is a productivity parameter. In this
set-up, parameter α is a composite of the labour elasticity of the production function and of the
price elasticity of the demand function for the product of the firm, as shown in Supplementary
Appendix F.1.1.
The firm needs to post vacant jobs to hire workers. A vacant job costs cV units of output
per period. In each period, the sequence of decisions is as follows: (1) an exogenous proportion
qt−1 of workers quit the firm; (2) vacant jobs are posted; (3) workers are hired; (4) production
takes place and wages are paid. The assumption of exogenous job separation, which allows us to
simplify the analysis, is consistent with the finding that the hiring credit did not induce firms to
increase labour turnover to benefit from the subsidy (Supplementary Appendix B).
A vacant job posted in period t is matched with a worker with probability mt ∈ [0,1] in
the period and remains vacant with probability 1−mt . The probability to fill a vacant job is
determined by a matching function: m(θt)= m¯θ−μt , where θt =Vt/Ut−1, equal to the ratio of the
number of job vacancies Vt over the number of unemployed workers Ut−1, denotes the labour
of coefficient δ when the dependent variable is L/L−1 in equation (2), equals 0.008. Thus, the number of jobs created
in the treatment group is 0.008×646,717=5,173. The zéro charges hiring credit provided 3.6 million euros to the firms
of the treatment group in our sample at the end of the period, i.e. in November 2009. Accordingly, at the end of 2009, the
monthly cost of creating one job amounts to 700 euros.
38. These costs do not account for the potential costs associated with distortive taxes used to finance the hiring
credit.
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market tightness; m¯ is a positive parameter, and μ, the elasticity of matching with respect to
unemployment, belongs to the interval (0,1).
Exogenous wages
Let us denote by wt the wage in period t and by (Zt,Lt−1) the value function of the firm,
where Zt = (At,wt,mt,qt−1). Let β denote the discount factor and Et the expectation operator.
When wages are exogenous, the value function of the firm satisfies
(Zt,Lt−1)=max
Vt
AtR(Lt)−wtLt −cV Vt +βEt(Zt+1,Lt)
subject to the law of motion of employment:
Lt = (1−qt−1)Lt−1+mtVt .
The solution of the firm’s problem is detailed in Supplementary Appendix F. When the wage
is exogenous (see Supplementary Appendix F.1), the equilibrium values of employment and of
the labour market tightness are defined by the labour demand equation derived from the solution
of the maximization problem of the firm, and by the law of motion of the unemployment rate
ut =1−Lt :
AtRL(Lt)=wt + cV
m(θt)
−β(1−qt)Et cV
m(θt+1)
(7)
ut =ut−1+qt−1(1−ut−1)−θtm(θt)ut−1. (8)
Endogenous wages
The case with endogenous wage is described by a directed search and matching model with
wage posting in the spirit of Moen (1997) and Kaas and Kircher (2015). In each labour pool,
employers post vacant jobs. Each job vacancy is posted with a non renegotiable wage which
applies throughout the employer–employee relationship. Unemployed workers are assumed to
have perfect information on the situation in each labour pool. Their search activity can be directed
towards their preferred employment pool. The mobility of workers between labour pools is perfect.
The solutions to the model and the computation of the cost per job created are presented in
Supplementary Appendix F.2.
The assumption of wage posting also implies that the market equilibrium allocation is
constrained efficient if the product market is perfectly competitive. To give room to welfare
improving hiring subsidies, we assume that there is imperfect competition on the product market.
This ensures that the market equilibrium unemployment rate is higher than the constrained efficient
unemployment rate.39
7.2.2. Structural estimation. Our objective is to estimate the parameters μ,cV and α=
LRLL(L)/RL(L), i.e. the elasticity of the marginal revenue with respect to labour. It is shown, in
39. An alternative possibility would have been to assume perfect competition on the product market and wage
bargaining. However, wage bargaining in large (i.e. with more than one employee) firms with decreasing marginal
productivity of labour induces over-employment, as shown by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Cahuc et al. (2008).
Accordingly, assuming wage bargaining in a context with large firms does not produce inefficiently high unemployment,
leaving less scope for welfare improving hiring credits.
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TABLE 7
Estimates of the parameters of the matching function
Dep. var. Job finding rate (log)
(1) (2)
OLS IV
Labour market tightness (log) 0.654∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.545∗∗∗
(0.060)
Year FE Yes Yes
Employment pool FE Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,392 1,044
Notes: Estimation of the parameter of the job matching function equation (A15) on 348 employment pools from 2006
to 2009. (1) Standard (within) OLS; (2) IV regression. As an instrument we use the lagged value of the labour market
tightness. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Source: Pôle emploi and Enquête emploi (Labour Force Survey, Insee).
Supplementary Appendix F, that these parameters, together with the discount factor β, the job
separation rate qt , the duration of job vacancies, 1/m(θt), and the unemployment rate ut , allow us
to compute the elasticity of employment with respect to different types of hiring credit: temporary,
permanent, targeted at a small subset of jobs, generalized to all jobs.
Following the search and matching literature (e.g. Kaas and Kircher, 2015; Hall, 2017),
the annual discount factor β is set at 0.95. The other statistics—qt,1/m(θt),ut—are directly
observable in our data. We conduct the structural estimation of parameters μ,cV and α in two
steps—see Supplementary Appendix E for more details on the data and on the estimation.
Matching technology
First, using data on job finding rates and tightness at the employment pool level from the
Public Employment Service and from the Labour Force Survey, we estimate the parameters of the
matching technology. The elasticity μ is identified using variations of job finding rates and labour
market tightness over time within employment pools. In the spirit of Borowczyk-Martins et al.
(2013), we address potential endogeneity issues using an IV strategy based on past values of
the labour market tightness. The results of the estimation are presented in Table 7. We obtain an
elasticity of the matching function with respect to the unemployment rate, μ, around 0.45.
Revenue function and vacancy posting cost
Second, we estimate the production parameters, namely the elasticity of the marginal revenue
with respect to labour, α, and the cost of posting a vacancy cV . These parameters are obtained by
conducting a structural estimation of the labour demand equation (7). The identification strategy,
which relies on the natural experiment triggered by zéro charges, is similar to the IV strategy
developed in section 5. We focus on small firms, which are eligible for the program. The policy
shock entails exogenous variations in labour cost that are used to identify the revenue parameter
α. In employment pools where the shock on labour cost is larger because the share of hires
eligible for the hiring credit is larger, average employment effects should also be larger. These
differences in employment effects yield the elasticity of the marginal revenue α. The estimation
strategy is complemented to as well recover the vacancy posting cost cV . The effects of the hiring
credit on employment are larger where baseline hiring costs are lower. Hiring costs depend on
the time needed to fill a vacancy. In a tight labour market, where vacancy duration is large, the
hiring credit is less effective. Using heterogeneity in the effects of the hiring credits across local
labour markets with low or large vacancy duration, we identify the vacancy posting cost cV . Both
parameters—the elasticity and the vacancy cost—are identified using the average values over
2006–8 in firms with 6 to 10 full-time employees of the share of eligible hires, of the duration
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TABLE 8
Estimates of the parameters of the revenue function and of the vacancy posting cost
(1) (2)
OLS IV
First stage
Dep. var. Average hiring credit Hiring cost
Share eligible hires 0.030∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.003) (0.012)
Duration of vacant jobs 0.020∗ 0.851∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.081)
Separation rate 0.015∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.007)
Second stage
Dep. var. Employment growth
Average hiring credit (a1) 0.694∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.282)
Hiring cost (b1) −0.050∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
Controls Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,588 1,588
Notes: This table presents the estimation of equation (A19). In the OLS and the second stage of the IV estimation,
the dependent variable is the average growth rate of employment from 1 December 2008 to 30 November 2009 in
each employment pool x sector unit, among firms with 6 to 10 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year.
The independent variables are the average hiring credit per employee and the hiring cost as defined in equation (A19).
Following the structural model, we control for the wage growth in small firms. To control for local shocks, we include
as covariates, the employment growth in firms with 10 to 14 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year and
the shift-share predictions of employment growth, defined as in the previous sections. We also add the average 2006–8
employment growth at the regional level, as above. We also control for key cell characteristics: the distribution of firms
age in the cell, the average share of part-time workers, and the share of firms with sales below 2 million euros in the
previous year. The average hiring credit per employee and the hiring cost are instrumented by the corresponding average
values of the share of eligible hires, of the duration of job vacancies and of the job separation rate among firms with 6 to
10 full-time employees over 2006–8. Weights are used: for each employment pool x sector unit the weight equals total
employment among firms with 6 to 10 full-time equivalent employees in the previous year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
Source: Pôle emploi and DADS (Insee).
of job vacancies and of the job separation rate, as instruments for the hiring credit and the hiring
cost in 2009. Note that the structural estimation of the labour demand is simplified by the fact
that the identifying shock has no impact on wages and labour market tightness, as shown in
Section 6.
The results of the regression of employment growth on labour cost and hiring costs are
presented in Table 8. We show in Supplementary Appendix E that the coefficient of the average
hiring credit, denoted a1, in the regression of Table 8 is the inverse of the absolute value of the
marginal revenue elasticity α. The IV estimate of a1 then entails that the elasticity of the marginal
revenue with respect to labour is about −0.96. We also show in the Supplementary Appendix
that the coefficient of the hiring cost, denoted b1, is the ratio of the vacancy cost in terms of wage
cV/wt−1 over the elasticity α. Consequently, Table 8 implies that the annual cost of a vacant
job represents 5.8% of the annual wage. Since the average duration of a job vacancy is about
0.2 year, the hiring cost amounts to 1.2% of the annual wage, which is in line with the available
empirical evidence.40 Overall, these values imply that the micro elasticity of employment to a
40. Kramarz and Michaud (2010) estimate that hiring costs represent 2.8% of the wage bill in France. Flinn (2006)
finds that the flow vacancy cost is 1.5% of the annual labour cost at the minimum wage in the U.S. For an overview on
several countries, see Manning (2011) Table 2, p 983.
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change in labour cost, which is about −1, is consistent with the difference-in-differences and the
IV estimates presented above.41
7.3. Cost per job created in different contexts
Let us remind that temporary hiring credits are one-off schemes that provide hiring subsidies
during specific periods, whereas permanent hiring credits provide them whatever the timing of
hiring. In both cases, the subsidy is paid for a short period of time (usually one year) following
the hiring. Neumark and Grijalva (2017) report that 99 of the 147 hiring credits recorded in the
U.S. over the period 1970–2012 are permanent. There is also a great diversity of hiring credits
in OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Accordingly, it is worth analysing in detail the consequences
of different types of hiring credits in different contexts. We first consider the cost per job created
when the hiring credit is either (non-expected, one-off) temporary or permanent. We analyse
these credits when they are either targeted at a small subset of firms or accessible to all firms, and
when wages are either rigid or flexible. A related issue concerns the feature of permanent hiring
credits, which can be time invariant, but also countercyclical, i.e. provided when the economy
slows down only. To deal with this issue, we use the equilibrium model to explicitly simulate
a context where the government is committed to provide the credits when the economy slows
down.
7.3.1. Permanent versus non-expected temporary hiring credits. In this section, we
compare one-off non-expected temporary hiring credits lasting one year (like zéro charges)
with time-invariant permanent hiring credits. Let us remind that the cost per job created by
a temporary hiring credit, set out for one year, corresponds to the monthly cost necessary to
create one supplementary job at the one-year time horizon, whereas the cost per job created by
a permanent hiring credit, set out without any foreseen time limit, is the monthly cost necessary
to create one supplementary job permanently, i.e. on an infinite time horizon. The costs per job
created reported in Table 9, are computed using the elasticities of employment with respect to
labour costs derived from the structural model in the neighbourhood of the steady state (see
Supplementary Appendices F.1 and F.2). The steady state values of the model are computed
over the 2005–8 pre-recession period used for the estimation of the structural parameters (see
Supplementary Appendix F.3). We evaluate the cost per job created for different values of the
product market power of firms. In line with available estimates (Bouis, 2008), the markup is set
equal to 1.3 in the benchmark case, corresponding to the actual situation in 2008. In the lower
panels of Table 9, we consider two alternative cases around this benchmark: zero markup, which
yields the constrained efficient allocation when the wage is endogenous, and a markup higher
than in the benchmark, equal to 1.6, which yields higher unemployment rate.
The importance of the duration of hiring credits
Table 9 shows that zéro charges was implemented in the most favourable situation: it was
temporary, targeted at a small subset of firms, and it occurred in a context where wages were
rigid. The cost per job created by a permanent hiring credit targeted at a small subset of firms in
the same environment would have been four times larger. This result is an immediate consequence
of the relation between the elasticity of employment with respect to a change in average labour
cost per job induced by a change in the wage of all workers, ε, and the elasticity of employment
with respect to a change in average labour cost per job induced by a temporary hiring credit,
41. This elasticity is defined by equation (F11) in Supplementary Appendix F.1.1.
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TABLE 9
Cost per job created (in percentage of the wage) by hiring credits in different contexts
Hiring credit To small subset of firms To all firms
Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent
Baseline mark-up: 1.3
Exogenous wage 25.2 96.9 25.7 102.9
Wage posting 25.2 96.9 26.1 217.0
High mark-up: 1.6
Exogenous wage 25.7 99.1 27.5 107.2
Wage posting 25.7 99.1 28.9 161.8
No mark-up
Exogenous wage 24.8 95.5 25.0 99.8
Wage posting 24.8 95.5 25.1 272.2
Notes: The cost per job created is gross, and as such it does not account for the savings induced by job creation in terms
of unemployment and other social benefits that would have been paid in the absence of the measure. It also ignores the
remaining social contributions paid by employees on these additional jobs. Hiring credits which are targeted at “small
subset of firms” entail no equilibrium effects. Hiring credits which are available to all firms entail equilibrium effects.
Temporary hiring credits are provided for hirings occurring during a period of one year. Permanent hiring credits are
time-invariant and provided for hirings occurring at any moment. The cost per job created is computed using the formula
derived in Supplementary Appendices F1, F2, and F3. The annual discount factor, β, is set to 0.95. The estimation of
the structural model yields: μ=0.45, α=−0.964 and the annual cost of a vacant job cv/w=0.056. The separation rate,
q, and the duration of job vacancies 1/m are computed from the DADS and Pole emploi data. We get q=0.5, 1/m=0.2 on
average over the period 2005–8. The unemployment rate in the benchmark situation reported in the top panel of the table
is computed from the French Labour Force Survey (Enquête emploi), which yields u=0.083. The share of employees that
benefit from the hiring credit on 30 November 2009 in firms with positive take-up in 2009 is computed from the DADS
and from the “hiring credit file”. We get η=0.26. The costs per job created when the price mark-up is high, and when
competition is perfect, are reported in the middle and the bottom panel respectively. These counterfactual environments
are detailed in Supplementary Appendix F.3.
εσ =ε/η where η stands for the share of employees that benefit from the hiring credit on 30
November 2009 in firms with positive take-up of zéro charges. In our setup, η is about 26%.
When the hiring credit becomes permanent, η goes to one and the cost per job created by the
hiring credit is increased by a factor of four.42 Accordingly, hiring credits are more effective at
creating jobs at a low cost when they apply on short periods of time.
Targeted versus economy-wide hiring credit
Table 9 shows that the cost per job created by hiring credits accessible to all firms is only
slightly bigger than the cost per job created by hiring credits targeted at a small subset of firms
when the wage is exogenous. This means that hikes in recruitment costs induced by the increase
in the labour market tightness associated with economy-wide hiring credits have only a small
impact on employment. This result is the consequence of small hiring costs as stressed above in
Section 7.2.2.
The adjustment of wages
The comparison of cases with endogenous and exogenous wages shows that the costs per job
created are very close in these two cases when the hiring credit is temporary. Note that they are even
identical when the hiring credit is targeted at a small subset of firms. This result is a consequence
of the assumption of decreasing marginal revenue. This implies that each firm optimally increases
the number of hires when the hiring credit is implemented instead of increasing the hiring wage
42. The cost per job created of a permanent hiring credit is equal to that of permanent employment subsidy if the
firms and the government face the same interest rate, which is assumed here.
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as long as the labour market tightness remains unchanged.43 In this context, an increase in the
reservation wage of workers, induced by the hike in the labour market tightness, is the only
channel through which the hiring credit exerts an impact on wages. Namely, in the period where
the hiring credit is implemented, firms are induced to post more job vacancies, which pushes the
labour market tightness up. The improvement in job finding raises the reservation wages and then
the equilibrium wages. The size of this effect is smaller when the hiring credit is temporary rather
than permanent, as discussed above. Indeed, in our setup, this mechanism has a small impact on
employment creation when the hiring credit is temporary since it increases the cost per job created
by about one point of percentage. The small impact of the reaction of wages relies in particular
on the relative low elasticity of the job matching function with respect to the unemployment rate,
which is estimated at 0.45 in our framework.
Nevertheless, the reaction of wages has a very strong impact when hiring credits are permanent:
the cost per job created by an economy-wide permanent hiring credit is about 2 times higher than
when wages are rigid.
The market power of firms
When firms have more power in the product market, the wage elasticity of employment
is smaller in absolute value (α is greater in absolute value—see details in Supplementary
Appendix F.3). This contributes to raising the cost per job created. The market power of firms has
another effect that goes in the opposite direction. It increases unemployment, which decreases
the hiring costs and exerts a downwards pressure on wages, and then reduces the cost per job
created.
As shown by the lower panels of Table 9, the cost per job created increases with the market
power of firms in all cases except when the hiring credit is permanent and wages are endogenous.
It is clear that the market power of firms has a small impact on the cost per job created for relevant
values of the markup when the wage is rigid or when the hiring credit is temporary. However, when
the hiring credit is permanent and wages react, the market power of firms can have a significant
impact on the cost per job created, which decreases by 100 percentage points when the markup
goes from 1 to 1.6. In this case, the further away from the constrained efficient equilibrium, the
more effective the hiring credit is to close the employment gap.
7.3.2. Countercyclical hiring credits. Our previous analysis compares (non-expected,
one-off) temporary hiring credits with permanent time-invariant hiring credits. Since the cost
of job creation is smaller in recession, because the labour market tightness is smaller when
unemployment is higher, the returns of expenditure on hiring subsidies is larger in recession. This
can justify a more intensive use of hiring subsidies in recessions.44 To analyse countercyclical
hiring credits, provided when the economy slows down only, we assume that the economy
fluctuates according to a Markov process between two states: a high-productivity low-separation
43. See the discussion in Supplementary Appendix, equation (F32). This mechanism is the consequence of
decreasing marginal productivity of labour. It also holds in a model with wage bargaining instead of wage posting. It
has been highlighted by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and examined further in a search and matching model by Cahuc et al.
(2008).
44. In the context of our model, recessions are driven by productivity shocks and there is no specific source
of inefficiency during recessions which could justify the use of hiring credits. Countercyclical markups could create
such inefficiencies. While there is some evidence that markups are countercyclical (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991;
Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996; Wilson and Reynolds, 2005; Ravn et al. 2006), there is no consensus of the empirical
literature on this issue (Nekarda and Ramey, 2013 and the articles they cite provide evidence for acyclicality or
procyclicality of markups).
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TABLE 10
Cost per job created (in percentage of the average wage) by temporary, time-invariant and counter-cyclical hiring
credits, along the business cycle
Hiring credit To small subset of firms To all firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temporary Invariant Countercyclical Temporary Invariant Countercyclical
Exogenous wage 25.2 97.2 49.9 26.1 106.1 53.4
Wage posting 25.2 97.2 49.9 26.8 256.2 101.0
Notes: Hiring credits which are targeted at “small subset of firms” entail no equilibrium effects. Hiring credits which
are available to all firms entail equilibrium effects. Temporary hiring credits are non-anticipated, one-off and provided
for hirings occurring over a period of one year during recessions. Time-invariant hiring credits are provided at every
moment. Countercyclical hiring credits are only provided in periods of recession. The price markup of firms is set to 1.3.
The cost per job created is computed thanks to simulations of the two-state search and matching model, described in
Supplementary Appendix F.4. Details about the calibration of the model are provided in Supplementary Appendix F.4.3.
The cost per job created is gross.
state with 7% steady state unemployment rate and a low-productivity high-separation state with
11% steady state unemployment rate, consistent with the French economy over the last 40 years
(see Supplementary Appendix F.4). Table 10 reports the cost per job created by temporary hiring
credits lasting one year during a recession (in columns 1 and 4), by time-invariant permanent
hiring credits (in columns 2 and 5) and by countercyclical hiring credits triggered during the
whole recession periods which last 25 months on average in France (in columns 3 and 6).45
Table 10 shows that the cost per job created by countercyclical hiring credits is much higher than
that of one-off non-anticipated temporary hiring credits lasting one year only.
A first reason is that slowdowns last 25 months on average, implying that a larger share of
employees benefit from the countercyclical credit than from the temporary hiring credit (which
by definition benefits hires occurring over a one-year period only). This effect approximately
doubles the cost of countercyclical hiring credits with respect to temporary hiring credits lasting
one year. Obviously, it would be smaller if the countercyclical hiring credit applied on shorter
periods.
A second reason is that, since labour is less expensive during slowdowns thanks to the
countercyclical hiring credit, firms substitute jobs in slowdowns for jobs in expansions. The
effect of this channel is quantitatively very small to the extent that it changes the timing of job
creation without modifying significantly its impact on overall job creation when wages remain
constant.46
The third reason comes from the upward pressure on wages exerted by the increase in hires
induced by the countercyclical hiring credit in recessions. The last column of Table 10 shows
that this last effect has a strong impact. When the hiring credit is economy-wide, this last effect
approximately doubles the cost per job created when the wage is endogenous compared to the
exogenous wage case. Then the countercyclical hiring credits is four times more costly than
the one-off temporary hiring credits. Such a difference cannot be explained by different shares
of subsidized hires over employment only, as the share of subsidized hires in countercyclical
45. The differences between the costs per job created by temporary/time-invariant hiring credits in Tables 9 and 10
are due to the fact that the baseline economies differ in both simulations sets.
46. The comparison of columns 1 and 3 (or 4 and 6, row 1) of Table 10 shows that the impact of this channel on the
cost per job created is quantitatively small, as the cost per job created by the countercyclical hiring credit is about twice
as high as that of the temporary credit. This factor almost maps the ratio of average recession length—25 months—to the
shorter duration of the temporary credit, which lasts for 12 months. Consequently, the first reason, related to the share
of infra-marginal employees in the firm, explains almost all the difference in the cost per job created between one-off
non-expected hiring credits and countercyclical hiring credits when the wage is exogenous.
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policies is twice the one in temporary credits.47 Therefore, the cost per job created by economy
wide countercyclical hiring credits remains high, even if it is significantly lower than that of
time-invariant hiring credits.
All in all, these analysis suggest, in line with the findings of Kaas and Kircher (2015), that there
is little room for economy-wide permanent hiring credits, either time-invariant or countercyclical,
when wages can react.
8. CONCLUSION
This article shows that a hiring credit targeted at small firms and low wage workers did have a
significant impact on employment in France during the 2008–9 recession. All in all, the hiring
credit was very effective. It allowed the government to create jobs at zero net cost in a short period
of time.
The estimation of a search and matching model shows, however, that the effectiveness of this
hiring credit relied on very special circumstances: it was (one-off, non-anticipated) temporary, it
was targeted at a small subset of firms and it was implemented in a context with high binding wage
floors and high unemployment. Among all these elements that have favoured the effectiveness
of the hiring credit, it appears that its temporary nature was key. The one-off non-anticipated
temporary nature of the hiring credit allows the government to lower the cost of entrants but
not that of incumbent workers with limited effects on wages which need time to adjust. This
implies that hiring credits can be effective to boost job creation at a low cost if they are non-
anticipated and implemented on short periods of time. The search and matching model suggests
that this conclusion also holds true for economy-wide hiring credits and even when the minimum
wage is not binding. Nevertheless, a counterpart of this positive conclusion is that hiring credits
create jobs at very high costs when they are permanent, either time-invariant or countercyclical,
especially when there are no high wage floors. This suggests that they should be avoided in such
circumstances.
Future research should aim at clarifying the differential impact of hiring credits and wage
subsidies on job separations. In this article, we found that job separations were unaffected by the
one-off hiring credit implemented during the 2008–9 recession. Consistently, job destruction is
considered exogenous in the model used to obtain structural estimates. However, in other settings,
job destruction could be reduced by wage subsidies or permanent hiring credits. In that case, their
costs per job created could be lowered compared with one-off, non-anticipated hiring credits.
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